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Abstract 
Running conventional laboratory experiments (i.e., with a standard student subject pool) is 
common practice in economic experiments especially when methodological issues are 
explored. However, generalization of the results from such experiments to the entire 
population is subject to severe critique. In this study we investigate warm glow in 
charitable auctions in a conventional lab experiment and an artefactual field experiment 
(i.e., lab experiment using subjects from the general population). The auction is 
constructed in a way to isolate warm glow by donating the sum of revenues by highest 
bidders to an environmental charity of subjects’ choice. Contributions motivated by pure 
altruism were eliminated by keeping constant the total amount the charity would receive. 
Results for the two subject pools are at complete odds. There is ample evidence of warm 
glow in the student subject pool but none in the consumer subject pool. Our findings 
suggest that conclusions from conventional lab experiments may not be immediately 
transferable to the general population. 
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1. Introduction  
The satisfaction that comes from contribution has long been identified as a 
motivation behind donations for public goods provision. The term ‘warm glow’ was first 
coined by Andreoni (1989) to distinguish among the pure egoist deriving utility (warm 
glow) from donating, like from any other private good, and the pure altruist being 
concerned only with the level of provision of a public good irrespectively of the method 
that this is financed. Since then, there has been ample evidence of satisfaction generated 
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by the act of giving in real and hypothetical valuation studies. Nunes and Schokkaert 
(2003) have used a list of attitudinal statements to identify potential warm glow incentives 
in a contingent valuation study. Their empirical results confirm the presence of warm 
glow in elicited willingness-to-pay (WTP) values. In a recent experiment, Crumpler and 
Grossman (2008) compare giving in a dictator game where participants’ contributions 
were crowded out by reduced giving by the proctor so that the charity of choice would 
always receive a preset amount. Contributions were thus motivated only by warm glow 
and authors report a significant percentage (between 51.3% and 77%) of respondents 
making positive contributions. Neural evidence further supports the existence of warm 
glow motives. Harbaugh et al. (2007) report certain neural activity taking place in areas 
known to respond to rewards when a payment to a public good is made. Consistent with 
the warm glow argument, this brain activation further increases when people make 
voluntary donations compared to mandatory tax payments. This is an indication that warm 
glow provides the giver a reward that is higher than the benefit the giver receives from 
paying an equivalent amount of taxes. 
On the other hand, Isaac et al. (2010) did not find any evidence of warm glow 
when revenues from an auction were donated to actual charities. Their results were robust 
even when a specialized subject pool consisting of students affiliated with a local church 
which already supported the charity was used in the experiment. However, in their 
application warm glow was not isolated from pure altruism. 
Meanwhile, a common criticism of laboratory experiments is that participants are 
usually students from western developed countries and thus results may not be 
representative of the entire population and consequently generalizable to consumer 
behaviour. Concern on the use of students as research surrogates for consumers or adults 
in general, is rather old (McNemar, 1946; Enis et al., 1972). Reasons are attributed to the 
fact that students exhibit psychological, social and demographical differences from other 
segments of the population but also to the fact that students are not yet complete 
personalities. Other arguments favour the use of students as experimental subjects when 
the nature of the research is universal. As stated by Lusk and Shogren (2007, p46): ‘A 
theory is a generalization that should hold for everyone, including students’. Following 
this line of reasoning using student samples when the aim of the study is to test a theory is 
of little concern. After six decades of research the debate is still active. Henrich et al. 
(2010) call the usual subject pool of experiments as WEIRDos, being an abbreviation of 
the Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic societies they live in and 
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argue that generalization of the findings relied upon these subjects can be misleading since 
they are outliers of the rest of humanity. Authors review a broad literature providing 
evidence of significant variability across human population and argue that universality 
cannot be claimed not even for fundamental behavioural processes. The arguments 
developed triggered the release of a special issue in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
journal (vol. 33, Issue 2-3, 2010) accommodating commentaries to the article and replies 
by the authors. The majority of the commentaries are supportive to the main thesis 
developed in the target article with authors agreeing on the need for research on culturally 
diverse, non-weird populations to permit generalization of the findings.  
 In measuring social preferences, Levitt and List (2007) argue that human 
behaviour may be influenced by a number of factors (moral considerations, scrutiny of 
ones actions by the others, context, self-selection and stakes of the game) that may differ 
between the lab and the outside world but also between different subject pools in 
laboratory experiments.  
Applying a second-order meta-analysis of studies examining the external validity 
of experiments that use student pools, Peterson (2001) concludes that ‘‘…researchers 
should be cautious when using college student subjects and be cognizant of the 
implications of doing so if the purpose of the investigation is to produce universal 
principles’’. More recent research has also shown that students exhibit different trust 
attitudes and thus contribute less in public good experiments (Gachter et al., 2004), exhibit 
less loss aversion when compared to professional traders (Haigh and List, 2005) and  are 
more selfish compared to workers manifested with  extremely decreasing offers between 
Ultimatum and Dictator games (Carpenter et al., 2004). In experimental auctions, studies 
attempting an external validity test of the results from student pools are rather few. 
Depositario et al. (2009) have found no significant differences in the bidding behaviour 
between students and the general population in an auction eliciting WTP for a novel food. 
A similar result is reported by Lusk (2005) in a meta-analysis of genetically modified food 
valuation studies. Authors, however, argue that their results should be treated with caution 
since the literature examining the validity of extrapolating the results from auctions with 
students to the broader population is rather limited.     
Motivated by the fact that the existing literature that investigates the existence of 
warm glow incentives in charitable auctions draws conclusions from experiments with 
student subject pools and given the ongoing debate on the legitimacy of generalizing 
results from students to the broader population, we offer a validity test of the results when 
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a representative sample is employed. We conducted one set of sessions with a standard 
student pool in what constitutes a conventional lab experiment (in Harrison and List’s 
(2004) terminology) and a second set of sessions with a representative sample of 
consumers (artefactual field experiment). Our experimental procedures were designed to 
isolate warm glow by donating revenues from auction winners to the charity of the 
majority’s choice by crowding out proctor’s contribution. This procedure is in essence a 
combination of the procedures employed by Isaac et al. (2010) and Crumpler and 
Grossman (2008). Comparing with standard auction (control) treatments we find that the 
warm glow theory is verified only for the student sample suggesting that arguments of 
generalizability of the conclusions from lab experiments with student pools merit greater 
attention.  
 
2. Experimental design 
The laboratory experiment was conducted in an experimental economics lab in the 
Agricultural University of Athens using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). For the 
consumer sessions, a random sample of the population of the city of Athens was drawn. 
Recruitment was undertaken by a professional research company and the requirement was 
that subjects did most or at least some of the grocery shopping for their household. This 
was necessary since the experiment was part of a larger project on food choice under 
environmental health risk. For the student sessions, subjects were recruited from the 
undergraduate student population of the university. None of the authors was their 
professor. 
A fourth-price auction was used to determine subjects’ buying price for the 
products in auction. The specifics of the nature of the experiment were not mentioned 
during the recruitment but we did provide information regarding the provision of 
stochastic fees. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples that are 
less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison et al. 2009) 
Our design involved two treatments, namely a standard auction treatment and a 
charitable auction treatment. Four sessions1 (two sessions per treatment) were conducted 
                                                 
1 In session 2 and session 4 of the consumer sessions, subjects were given additional information on the 
higher health risk to which children are exposed, given their longer time span, when consuming 
contaminated agricultural products. The aim of these two sessions was to further examine whether 
consumers respond differently when provided with this extra information. Results of this analysis will be 
reported elsewhere. Although it is out of the scope of this paper, a dummy variable indicating whether 
additional information was provided to respondents is included in the econometric analysis to control for 
potential information effects (see table 3). 
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with a total of 61 consumers and two sessions (one session per treatment) with a total of 
36 students. The average duration of a session was a little more than an hour and 
experiments were conducted in June 2010. Each session included a training phase and an 
auction phase. For the treatment that aimed to isolate warm glow, a charity selection phase 
preceded the auction. Subjects were given prior instructions on the overall layout of the 
session and were also reminded the procedures at the beginning of each phase. 
Table 1 shows the experimental design. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., 
one of the authors) for all sessions. Table 2 displays the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the subjects.  
 
Table 1. Experimental design and number of subjects 
 Students Consumers 
Charitable auction 
Treatment 18 29 (15+14) 
Non charity (standard 
auction) Treatment 18 32 (16+16) 
 
 
2.1 The training phase 
 After arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. A 
computer-training phase was conducted for subjects in the consumer sessions that did not 
have previous experience with computers. An interactive PowerPoint application was used 
that allowed subjects to familiarize with the mouse and keyboard. The training with the 
auction phase followed.  
To control for possible monetary endowment effects, subjects were told that 
further to their participation fee, a random amount of money was going to be assigned to 
each one of them. For consumers this amount ranged between €0.5 and €5 and for students 
between €0.5 and €3. Participation fees were fixed to 20€ for consumers and 15€ for 
students. Different fees intended to approximate what is a standard compensation fee for 
these subjects’ pools. Everyone then received a random draw determining their individual-
specific extra fee. We emphasized to the subjects that the endowment they received was 
private information and that they should not communicate this information to other 
subjects in the lab. All transactions were completed at the end of the experiment. 
Subjects initially watched a short PowerPoint presentation to familiarize them with 
the auction and procedures. The presentation included a short explanation of the fourth-
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price auction, along with a numerical example demonstrating why it is in subjects’ best 
interest not to deviate from bidding their true value for the good under evaluation. 
Subjects then took a short computerized test regarding the procedure. The monitor 
explained the correct answers afterwards. 
 Subjects then bid in three practice hypothetical auction rounds for a bag of potato 
chips. The monitor emphasized that these rounds were hypothetical and that one binding 
round would be randomly chosen at the end of these rounds. A screen displayed subjects’ 
hypothetical earnings after these rounds. 
After getting fully familiarized with the auction mechanism and procedures, 
subjects bid in three real auction rounds for a chocolate bar. The monitor emphasized that 
these rounds were now real and that the highest bidders would actually pay for the 
products. Again, one round was randomly chosen as binding at the end of these rounds. A 
screen displayed subjects’ earnings after these rounds. Between rounds the only available 
information was whether the subject was one of the highest bidders or not. 
 
2.2 The charity organization selection phase 
This phase was only applied in the charitable auction treatment (see Table 1). 
Subjects were asked to select their favorite organization from a list of six non-government 
organizations (NGOs) with the understanding that the NGO selected by most subjects in 
the session will be donated an amount of €30 by the proctor. Subjects were told that 
deposit verification will be sent to everyone’s mail address. The donation amount was 
specified to 30€ since usually this is what most NGOs request for annual membership. All 
charities were environmental NGOs and a short description from each NGOs website was 
provided to subjects (all experimental instructions, supplemental material and information 
provided to subjects are available at https://sites.google.com/site/warmglowweirdos/). The 
selected charity was revealed only after the auction phase was through. 
 
2.3 The auction phase  
In the auction phase subjects were endowed with one kilo of potatoes from a very 
specific location of the country. The region was never revealed to subjects and was called 
with the generic name “region A”. Potatoes were packed in paper bags and were labeled  
“Potatoes from region A”.  
A leaflet was then distributed to subjects that described the environmental profile 
of region A (see Appendix). In brief, the leaflet mentioned that the initial potatoes 
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endowment from region A is of unknown quality due to extensive pollution of the 
groundwater but the risks for human health could not be assessed since the 
epidemiological study in the area of origin was not completed. The description accurately 
described region A and in fact epidemiologists and agronomists that study the 
environmental health effects of this specific region were advised about the content of the 
leaflet (see Appendix). 
Subjects were then asked to bid to exchange a kilo of potatoes from region A with 
a kilo of potatoes from region B. A second leaflet was subsequently distributed to subjects 
(prior to the actual auction) with a description of the environmental profile of region B 
(see Appendix). In brief, the leaflet described region B as being in a good ecological status 
(in the terminology of the European Water Framework Directive) and explained that this 
characterization implies that, among others, agricultural products are safe for human 
health. We made sure that potatoes from the two regions are of the same variety to avoid 
differences in appearance characteristics. Potatoes were packed in a similar paper bag and 
were labeled  “Potatoes from region B”. Both potatoes are available at the market for sale 
but the origin was not revealed to subjects to avoid regional affiliation effects. The label 
was the only visible difference between the two products. 
 To elicit subjects’ WTP, a 4th price Vickrey auction was employed. Considering 
the size of the session groups and the likelihood of disengaging some of the participants 
due to small number of winners, the 4th price auction was regarded as a compromise 
between a 2nd price auction and a nth random price auction for engaging off-margin 
bidders2. Subjects participated in five consecutive rounds and were told that at the end one 
round would be randomly chosen as binding. Between rounds subjects again could only 
observe if they were one of the highest bidders of the previous round or not. 
 
2.4 Isolating warm glow incentives  
 In the charitable auction treatment, subjects were additionally informed that the 
revenues from the highest bidders would be donated to the charity selected by the 
                                                 
2 Shogren, Margolis, Koo, and List (2001) found that the 2nd price auction worked better for on-margin 
bidders while the random nth price auction worked better for off-margin bidders. Harrison (2006) and 
Harrison, Harstad and Rutstrom (2004) emphasize the importance of having simultaneous bid submission 
rather than having real-time bid submission or real-time sequential bid submission such as in an English 
auction. Another popular mechanism is the Becker-Degroot Marschak (BDM) mechanism, even though it is 
not an auction per se. Lusk and Rousu (2006) have found that on average the 2nd price auction and the nth 
price auction are more accurate than the BDM. In addition, Shogren, Cho et al. (2001) found that the 
Willigness To Pay /Willigness To Accept gap remains present in a BDM mechanism while it disappears in 
active market environments like the 2nd and nth price auctions. 
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session’s majority on their behalf and a deposit receipt would be mailed to the address of 
the highest bidders. 
To disentangle motives behind donations in the charity treatment we followed 
Crumpler and Grossman (2008). We crowded out participants donation by reduced giving 
by the proctor so as to keep the charity contribution constant at €30. Subjects were told 
that the charity would receive neither more nor less than €30 and that the monitor would 
add to the contributions by the highest bidders that much, so that the total amount would 
always sum to €30. Only respondents with warm glow incentives, purchasing moral 
satisfaction from the act of giving itself, had thus incentive to contribute higher in the 
charitable auction sessions. Since the amount the charity would be  receiving was preset 
(fixed), pure altruists, deriving utility from increases in provision of public goods, had no 
incentive to raise their contribution when a charitable session was employed.  
Formally, drawing, and modifying, from the original work of Andreoni (1989), the 
utility function of a pure altruist is ( , )purealtruist purealtruistU u x Y , with altruistpurex  denoting 
individuals consumption of the private good x  and Y  being the total supply of the public 
good as follows: others purealtruistY G g  , where othersG  is  the contributions of all other 
individuals to the public good and purealtruistg  is pure altruist’s own contribution to the 
public good. A pure altruist would thus donate to a charity in order to raise the total 
contributions and subsequently the level of provision of the public good.  On the other 
hand, an individual holding pure warm glow incentives cares only for her contribution 
irrespectively of the level of the public good provision: ),( egoistegoistegoist gxuU  . 
If the total contribution to public good Y  is fixed, and thus the amount of the 
public good to be provided is not sensitive to individual’s contribution, a pure altruist will 
contribute nothing. Therefore, in this context, pure altruists should not alter their bidding 
behaviour in the charitable treatment. If, however, average bids are higher when a charity 
treatment is employed, this is evidence of warm glow i.e., people derive utility from their 
contribution irrespective of the level of provision of the public good. Thus, the main 
advantage of this design is its ability to isolate warm glow incentives from pure altruism3. 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge that under this design, as Crumpler and Grossman (2008) admit, warm glow incentives 
may be cooled-off by subjects’ unwillingness to reduce the financial pressure to the proctor. That is, subjects 
may think that the proctor expects them to free-ride and thus play along. On the other hand, it is also likely 
that an experimenter bias is present. Respondents may assume that the experimenter expects them to bid 
more and thus behave accordingly in the charitable auction session to please the experimenter. On the 
absence of any prior knowledge as to which, if any, of these motives prevails, it may as well be that on 
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To check respondents understanding of the donation mechanism we asked three 
test questions, two before the auction took place and one at the demographic collection 
phase. The exact questions were: 
“Suppose the highest bidders pay in TOTAL 6€ to exchange their endowed product:  
1. How much money will the HIGHEST BIDDERS donate to the selected NGO?  
2. How much money will be donated in TOTAL (that is, by US and the HIGHEST 
BIDDERS)?” 
“Suppose the highest bidders pay in TOTAL 8€ to exchange their endowed product:  
3. How much money in TOTAL (that is, by US and the HIGHEST BIDDERS) would 
the NGO receive?” 
Subjects that failed to answer two or more questions were dropped from the subsequent 
analysis which resulted in dismissing observations from 2 individuals. 
 
2.5 The post-auction phase 
The socio-economic background of the subjects was elicited in the final phase. 
Experimental instructions are available at https://sites.google.com/site/warmglowweirdos/. 
 
3. Research Hypothesis and Data Analysis 
To scrutinize our data for warm glow we need to examine whether submitted bids 
in the charitable auction treatment (where revenues by highest bidders are donated to the 
charity) are higher than bids in the standard auction procedure (where revenues are 
collected by the experimenter to provide the good). Higher WTP estimates in the 
charitable auction treatment would be an evidence of warm glow motives. We are further 
interested in investigating whether similar results are obtained between subject pools. 
Students are commonly used in economic laboratory experiments. Especially when it 
comes to methodological studies, it is very common for experimenters to employ 
WEIRDos as their guinea-pigs and rarely question the generalizability of the observed 
behavior into the general population. Our study, therefore offers a test of external validity 
of the experimental results when student pools are employed contributing to the ongoing 
debate on whether results from students can be extrapolated to the entire adult population.  
 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
                                                                                                                                                   
average these effects cancel-out. In any case we have no reason to expect these effects to influence 
differently the two samples considered. 
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Simple statistics can help illuminate our research questions. Figure 1 shows mean 
and median bids across rounds by subject pool and treatments. Solid lines refer to the 
auctions that purported in isolating warm glow (i.e., the charitable auctions) and dashed 
lines refer to the standard auction treatment. Raw data draw a completely different picture 
for the bidding behaviour of each subject pool. The student pool reconfirms what is widely 
reported in the literature: warm glow is evident and subjects derive utility just from the act 
of giving. Even though subjects were aware that their contribution was crowded out by 
reduced giving by the proctor they tend to bid on average twice as much as the control 
group in every round.  
 The consumer subject pool is, however, at complete odds. The warm glow turns 
“cold” with consumers bidding on average less than the control group, a difference which 
becomes as large as €0.3 in round 5. 
 
Figure 1. Mean and median bids across rounds 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
To account for the panel nature of our data, we estimated a random effects 
regression model for each subject pool as well as for the pooled sample. Variables in the 
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regression function for each subject pool are displayed in Table 3 and explained in Table 
2. We assume bidding behavior to be affected by the treatment variables, respondents’ 
socio-demographic characteristics, perceived health risk associated with the consumption 
of potatoes from areas A and B respectively and potato consumption habits.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Variable description 
Variable Variable description Students Consumers 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Bid Bid to exchange product 0.626 0.628 0.604 0.589 
Charity Dummy, 1=Subject participated in the charitable auction  0.500 0.507 0.458 0.502 
Students* Dummy, 1=Subject is student Mean: 0.379  SD: 0.488 
HRisk 
Dummy, 1=Subject received 
additional health risk information 
regarding children 
- - 0.492 0.504 
TotFee Total money endowment 16.917 0.806 22.805 1.531 
ti Dummy, 1=Round i where i=1 to 5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Age Subject’s age 20.972 1.665 41.508 9.839 
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.389 0.494 0.305 0.464 
Income Dummy, 1=Subject’s household economic position is above average 0.361 0.487 0.475 0.504 
Kids Dummy, 1=Subject has underage kids - - 0.339 0.477 
Educ 
Dummy, 1= subject is 4th year 
student or higher 
0.306 0.467 - - 
Dummy, 1=Subject has a university 
diploma ** 
- - 0.610 0.492 
DangA*** 
Dummy, 1=Subject perceives 
consumption of agricultural 
products from region A as being 
dangerous for her health 
0.611 0.494 0.864 0.345 
NotDangB*** 
Dummy, 1=Subject perceives 
consumption of agricultural 
products from region B not being 
dangerous for her health 
0.805 0.401 0.830 0.378 
ConsPot1**** 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 1-2 times/month or less 0.083 0.280 0.153 0.363 
ConsPot2 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 1 time/week 0.222 0.421 0.186 0.393 
ConsPot3 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 2-3 times/week 0.527 0.506 0.441 0.501 
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ConsPot4 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 4-5 times/week or more 
often 
0.166 0.378 0.220 0.418 
* Only applicable to the pooled model. 
** This is the definition used in the pooled model as well. 
*** These were measured on 7-point Likert scales and were dummy coded for the analysis 
**** Excluded from estimations to avoid perfect multi-collinearity 
 
Table 3 displays regression coefficients. Note that the coefficients and standard 
errors of the interacted variables (Student, Charity) in the pooled model take into 
consideration the coefficient of the interaction term, following similar procedures to 
Drichoutis and Nayga (2010). For the Student variable this would be: 
2 3
Bid b b Charity
Student
          (1) 
Expression (1) can then be evaluated as:  
2 3
1Charity
Bid b b
Student 
     and  20Charity
Bid b
Student 
     (2) 
Similarly for the Charity variable we have: 
1 3
1Student
Bid b b
Charity 
     and  10Student
Bid b
Charity 
     (3) 
 
Table 3. Results from random effects regression models 
  Pooled sample Consumer subject pool Student subject pool 
  Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
Constant  2.329** 1.087 1.769 1.267 4.677** 1.854 
Charity 
(non-
interacted) 
 - - -0.251 0.155 0.441*** 0.138 
Charity 
(interaction) 
Student=1 0.443** 0.172 
- - - - 
Student=0 -0.297** 0.139 
Student 
Charity=1 -0.157 0.357 
- - - - 
Charity=0 -0.897** 0.372 
Hrisk  -0.148 0.137 -0.208 0.148 - - 
TotFee  -0.098** 0.042 -0.073 0.050 -0.207** 0.098 
T2  0.074*** 0.027 0.058* 0.033 0.098** 0.046 
T3  0.131*** 0.027 0.149*** 0.033 0.103** 0.046 
T4  0.157*** 0.027 0.189*** 0.033 0.104** 0.046 
T5  0.194*** 0.027 0.236*** 0.033 0.125*** 0.046 
Age  0.003 0.007 0.005 0.008 -0.083 0.060 
Gender  -0.159 0.113 -0.094 0.171 -0.243* 0.146 
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Income2  0.182* 0.107 0.235 0.146 0.033 0.146 
Educ2  -0.037 0.142 0.007 0.155 0.216 0.209 
Kids  - - -0.068 0.168 - - 
DangA  0.238* 0.137 0.079 0.236 0.404*** 0.137 
NotDangB  0.388*** 0.143 0.436** 0.209 0.429** 0.174 
ConsPot2  0.386** 0.195 0.392 0.275 0.512* 0.277 
ConsPot3  -0.024 0.176 -0.170 0.241 0.356 0.243 
ConsPot4  0.126 0.192 -0.004 0.251 0.656** 0.303 
R-squared  0.288 0.278 0.550 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Regression coefficients confirm the main findings of the unconditional analysis. 
Students bid on average €0.44 more in the charitable auction compared to the standard 
auction which is a clear evidence of warm glow. On the other hand, consumers in the 
charitable auction sessions bid on average €0.25 less than consumers in the standard 
auctions, reinforcing the picture of Figure 1. Note that the coefficient is marginally not 
significant (p-value=0.106). 
The pooled model reconfirms inferences drawn from the two subsamples. Students 
that participated in the charitable auctions bid on average €0.44 more than students that 
participated in the standard auction sessions. Simply stated, it corresponds to the 
difference between the red solid and red dashed lines in Figure 1. On the other hand, 
consumers that participated in the charitable auctions bid on average €0.29 less than 
consumers that participated in the standard auctions. This corresponds to the difference 
between the blue solid and blue dashed lines of Figure 1. 
Other differences that are evident in Table 3 show that subjects increased bids across 
rounds by as much as 23 cents in round 5. Student subjects did increase their bids as well 
but by a lower amount of money than consumers. Gender differences are also evident. 
Male subjects bid up to €0.24 less than female subjects which is a common finding in 
WTP studies and particular in auctions. The difference is not significant for the consumer 
subject pool and the pooled model. Income has an economic and statistical significant 
effect as well. Subjects from households with a self-evaluated economic position above 
average, bid higher by as much as €0.18 in the pooled model.  
As expected subjects that perceived consumption of agricultural products from region 
A to pose a high health risk bid more to exchange their endowed products with potatoes 
from region B. This is particularly profound for the student sample which bids on average 
0.4€ more to exchange potatoes A with potatoes B. Similarly, subjects that perceived 
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region B posing no health risk bid 0.38€ to 0.43€ more. Consumption habits of potatoes 
also have an effect on bidding behavior with subjects consuming potatoes more frequently 
bidding more for the exchange with potatoes from region B. Other effects in Table 3 don’t 
look substantial in terms of economic significance. 
 
4. Discussion 
Student pools are widely used as experimental subjects in laboratory applications. 
After six decades of research in experimental economics, the question on their 
representativeness and consequently on the extent to which results derived from them 
generalize to the entire adult population is still open, triggering hot debates. This study 
offers an external validity test of the presence of warm glow motives when a charitable 
auction is administered to students. We find that student subjects drawn from a university 
population and consumer subjects drawn from the general population behaved in a 
completely opposite direction. The student pool verified the presence of warm glow 
motives behind charitable giving. Student subjects were bidding more in an auction that 
contributed the sum of revenues by highest bidders to a charity, than a control group that 
was bidding in a standard auction. This was so even though subjects knew that their 
contribution was crowded out by reduced giving by the proctor.  Oddly, the consumer 
subject pool was bidding less than the control group. 
This study therefore shows that inferences drawn from a student population are not 
automatically transferable to the general population even when a methodological issue is 
explored. Economists, however, use subjects drawn from the student population to study a 
myriad of economic inquiries e.g. the WTP-WTA gap (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Isoni et al., 
2010),  self-selection bias (Eckel and Grossman, 2000; Cleave et al., 2010),  information 
effects (Healy 2009),  hypothetical bias (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; Spencer et al., 
1998), the initial endowment effects (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006) and warm glow itself 
(Crumpler and Grossman, 2010; Isaac et al., 2010). Whether different subject pools can 
lead every economic experiment to different inferences is not a generalization we want or 
can make. We further recognize that consumers from western and developed societies, like 
those participated in our experiments, can be as weird as students and therefore claims of 
universality of our results are not intended. Results under this study, however, do urge, in 
agreement with the concerns raised by Henrich et al. (2010), for validation of the results 
drawn from WEIRDos using representative and diverse samples before firm conclusions 
are drawn. Finally, although it is unlikely that the observed differences in the two samples 
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are procedure-specific, since a standard auction procedure was employed following 
established protocols from the literature, there is definitely scope for further research 
before generalization can be claimed. 
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7. Appendix 
 
A. Environmental Health Risk information 
Environmental profile of region A 
Region A is characterized by intensive industrial activity, with many of the industries 
not fulfilling the safety standards, and intensive agricultural activity. Underground water 
analysis has revealed the presence of heavy metals, such as chromium and nickel, which 
may have contaminated plants through irrigation. The severity of these substances for 
human health depends on the degree and the duration of the exposure. However, an 
epidemiological study assessing accurately the risks for human health from the 
consumption of agricultural products from region A, has not been performed yet. In 
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addition, with respect to potatoes heavy metals tend to accumulate in the skin of potatoes 
and not in the interion that is commonly consumed. 
 
Environmental profile of region B 
Region B is classified as in good ecological status, according to the European Water 
Framework Directive. The good ecological status guarantees that pollution loads are 
minor such that there is no risk for human health and aquatic life. The agricultural sector 
follows good agricultural and environmental practices and there is no industrial 
activity in the area. Measurements in potatoes from the area revealed that the 
accumulation in heavy metals is far below the international safety levels. 
 
B. Environmental Organizations 
 1. ARCTUROS  
ARCTUROS is an Environmental, Non Governmental, non profit organization that was 
founded in 1992 for the protection and management of wildlife and natural environment. 
To achieve its goals the organization is undertaking field activities, conducting scientific 
research, awareness campaigns, environmental training, promoting volunteerism for the 
protection of wildlife and the empowerment of biodiversity and sustainability in Greece 
and abroad.   
 
2. MOM  
MOM, the Hellenic Society for the Study and Protection of the Monk Seal is a non-profit 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) that is supported by more than 6,500 members in 
Greece and internationally. Its activities target the conservation of the critically 
endangered marine mammal, the Mediterranean Monk Seal Monachus monachus and its 
marine and coastal habitats.  
 
3. PELAGOS  
The Pelagos Cetacean Research Institute is a scientific, non-profit and non-governmental 
organization that works for the development of cetacean research aiming at the 
conservation of dolphins, whales, seals and their natural habitat in both Greece and the 
Mediterranean Sea.   
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4. Plant-a-Tree.gr  
Plant-a-Tree.gr is a young company that provides tree planting and envisages the raising 
of environmental awareness of Greeks, being people, unions, or industries, towards 
initiatives that will ‘green’ their city.  
 
 
 
 
5. WWF 
  
WWF Greece is part of the international WWF family, which consists of 50 National 
Organizations and works for the protection of the environment in more than 100 countries. 
WWF’s mission is to conserve the rich biodiversity of Greece, to prevent and eventually 
to reverse environmental degradation, seeking the harmonious coexistence of humans with 
nature.  
 
6. MEDITERRANEAN SOS Network 
MEDITERRANEAN SOS Network is an environmental and social Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) of non-profit character. The Network is active since 1990 for the 
protection of the natural and cultural wealth of the Mediterranean, paying particular 
attention to the protection of coasts and the sea and their sustainable management, the 
protection of bio-diversity, sustainable management of energy, water resources and waste, 
protection of global climate and last but not least diminishing the nuclear threat. 
